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Abstract
We present nine facets for the analysis of the past
and future evolution of AI. Each facet has also a set
of edges that can summarise different trends and
contours in AI. With them, we ﬁrst conduct a quan-
titative analysis using the information from two
decades of AAAI/IJCAI conferences and around
50 years of documents from AI topics, an ofﬁ-
cial database from the AAAI, illustrated by several
plots. We then perform a qualitative analysis using
the facets and edges, locating AI systems in the in-
telligence landscape and the discipline as a whole.
This analytical framework provides a more struc-
tured and systematic way of looking at the shape
and boundaries of AI.
1 Introduction
“What is AI?” has been a common question from the incep-
tion of the discipline in the 1950s [McCarthy et al., 2006;
Moor, 2006; Solomonoff, 2017] until the end of the last cen-
tury [Lehman-Wilzig, 1981; Fetzer, 1990; McCarthy, 1998].
In the twenty-ﬁrst century, the discipline is not only well-
developed but it is often said that this is the age of AI [Mc-
Corduck, 2004]. AI is set to pervade and transform every
aspect of life. In a way, this is no different from what com-
puter science has already been doing, creating computerised,
digital and virtual versions of almost everything, with AI now
introducing new adjectives such as ‘intelligent’, ‘smart’ and
‘cognitive’ to almost every process or gadget, from medi-
cal diagnosis to personal assistants. This expected expansion
and intertwining with every other research discipline and as-
pect of life is pushing the contours of AI in many directions.
However, unlike computer science, which is based on well-
established models of computation that integrate hardware
and software, AI has evolved with a more ﬂuid deﬁnition,
primarily because of our varied conceptions of intelligence.
When looking at the deﬁnitions of (artiﬁcial) intelligence
(see, e.g., [Legg and Hutter, 2007], for a compendium),
we see that deﬁnitions can be categorised according to two
distinct dimensions, following [Russell and Norvig, 2009].
First, we can characterise intelligence in terms of “thinking”
(process-oriented) or “acting” (goal-oriented). Second, we
can characterise intelligence taking humans as a reference or
looking for a more abstract or universal reference (such as ra-
tionality). These two dimensions are summarised in Table 1.
Not all deﬁnitions can be clearly classiﬁed according to
this table. For instance, Minsky’s famous deﬁnition of AI, as
the “science of making machines capable of performing tasks
that would require intelligence if done by [humans]” [Minsky,
1968], uses humans as a reference, so it would be located
on the left of the table, but still somewhere between the top
and bottom part of the table as it focuses on processes (i.e.,
thinking) for humans and tasks (i.e., acting) for machines
This suggests that we can look at these dimensions in a
more nuanced, continuous way, as facets rather than discrete
categories, to look at the evolution of AI as a discipline. For
instance, has AI been more focused towards “thinking” (and
hence processes or techniques) or more focused towards “act-
ing’ (and hence tasks and applications)? Is it more or less in-
ﬂuenced by human intelligence (using human processes and
the tasks humans can actually solve) or is the discipline going
in a direction of a more abstract or universal characterisation?
In this paper, we will develop these and other dimensions into
facets to characterise the object of AI, i.e., the AI systems and
services, such as generality, location and embodiment, and
the subject of AI, such as paradigms, actors, character and
nature, as a discipline. With these facets we will perform a
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the evolution of AI.
We will base our analysis on evidence as much as possible,
looking at data from scientiﬁc venues, reports, surveys and
other sources. At the end of the paper, we will take a more
principled stance and we will discuss how to extrapolate these
Thinking Humanly Thinking Rationally
Acting Humanly Acting Rationally
Table 1: Categories of (artiﬁcial) intelligence deﬁnitions, according
to the two binary dimensions in [Russell and Norvig, 2009, Fig. 1.1].
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trends or identify what kinds of criteria are necessary to es-
tablish AI contours that can be more stable and useful.
The contributions of this paper are a set of well-structured
facets to analyse the location and contours of AI. This is
complemented by substantial evidence collected from several
sources, such as 20 years of the IJCAI and AAAI proceed-
ings and the whole AI topics database1. All the datasets, plots
and code to scrape and process this data are made publicly
available (see footnote 7).
There are several reasons why using clear criteria such as
the facets and edges are helpful for deﬁning AI, how it has
evolved and what it is likely to be in the future. First, in-
ternally, the research community needs clear criteria to de-
termine what is in or out of scope, for conferences, journals,
funding and hiring. Second, policy makers are considering
ways of regulating AI, but wrestle with the problem of deﬁn-
ing what systems are actually AI. Third, different terms are
being used to capture the same subparts or forms of AI, such
as artiﬁcial general intelligence (AGI), machine intelligence,
cognitive computing, computational intelligence, soft com-
puting, etc. Without a clear structure about AI, it is difﬁ-
cult to determine whether they are part, they overlap or they
are simply redundant. Fourth, some areas, such as machine
learning, are taking a more relevant role in AI, but they are
also intertwined with areas such as statistics, optimisation or
probability theory, which were not always considered near the
contours of AI. Fifth, along the history of AI there has been
rise and decline of interest and research towards the different
AI paradigms, techniques and approaches.
2 Background
Disciplines are commonly analysed historically, and AI is
not an exception. A history of a discipline usually empha-
sises the problems, progress and prospects, but not neces-
sarily delineates its contours. For instance, there are several
excellent accounts of the history of AI [McCorduck, 2004;
Buchanan, 2005; Nilsson, 2009; Boden, 2016]. Some of them
cover AI from a philosophical perspective. However, given
the implications of AI for the interpretation of the human
mind, the analysis of AI as a discipline (as usual from the
viewpoint of philosophy –or methodology– of science) is not
commonly done in terms of its external and internal contours.
As a result, several key questions remain: what are the crite-
ria to recognise that an entity is part of AI? Furthermore, how
can we recognise the internal subdisciplines in AI?
One possible approach to this is to determine the nature
and contours of AI by its common use. While this may be
a good approach for evaluating progress as a whole or for a
few benchmarks2, the analysis of subdisciplines by their pop-
ularity may be prone to many terminological confusions and
many vested interests, with the risk of having characterisa-
tions that are very volatile, such as big data.
Bibliometric approaches are a common tool to analyse dis-
ciplines, but the focus is usually put on impacts per author,
venue, location or institution. Sometimes, bibliometrics stud-
ies disciplines and subdisciplines. For instance, Scimago pro-
1https://aitopics.org.
2See, e.g., http://aiindex.org/ and https://www.eff.org/ai/metrics.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence Artiﬁcial Neural network+ Genetic algorithm+
Expert System* Optimization* Prediction*
Classiﬁcation* Design* Fuzzy Logic+
Multi-agent system+ Simulation* Support Vector Machine+
Machine Learning+ Diagnosis* Data mining*
Swarm intelligence+ Particle swarm optimization+ Decision support system*
Pattern recognition* Knowledge-based system* Case-based reasoning*
Distributed artiﬁcial intelligence+ Knowledge representation* Management*
Identiﬁcation* Decision making* Fault Diagnosis*
Computational intelligence+ Recognition* Ontology+
Table 2: Top 30 high-frequency keywords used for the bibliometric
analysis in [Niu et al., 2016, Tab. 6]. Those shown with ‘+’ are
included in their Fig. 6 (methods and models) and those with ‘*’ are
included in their Fig. 7 (applications).
Applications Cognitive modeling Game theory
Heuristic search & optimization Humans & AI Knowledge representation
Machine learning Multiagent systems Natural language processing
Planning Search & constraint satisfaction Vision & robotics
Table 3: A selection of keywords as an intersection of the two last
columns of [Moran et al., 2014, Tab. 2].
vides a way of looking at the “shape of science”3 where one
can locate AI and some of its subareas in terms of their inter-
nal and external relations. Provided with a set of tags, biblio-
metrics can study how frequent several tags are in published
papers (including titles, keywords or abstracts). For instance,
[Niu et al., 2016] includes a thorough historical analysis of
publications in about 20 relevant journals in AI (but not con-
ferences or open journals such as JAIR) from 1990 to 2014.
The number of publications is shown by 5-year periods. The
keywords used are shown in Table 2.
As we can see in the list, the keywords include terms for
disciplines and subdisciplines, techniques, and application ar-
eas, from which the authors distinguish “methods and mod-
els” and “applications”. As the analysis is limited to most fre-
quent areas, it excludes important subﬁelds of AI (e.g., “plan-
ning”) and some assignments are vague, with keywords such
as “design”, “identiﬁcation” or “prediction”.
Still, we see that this analysis is aligned with the ﬁrst facet
mentioned in the introduction, of whether the discipline is
characterised by their techniques or their applications. This
is not surprising, as it is a typical categorisation of disciplines
according to their techniques and applications, especially in
engineering. A proper cataloguing effort (e.g., as done by
ACM and other associations for computing) would be an op-
tion, but AI is too dynamic to allow for a stable set of terms
for a long period.
In the end, instead of a reactive approach focusing on the
trends, a more proactive stance towards the recognition of the
subdisciplines can be seen as a duty for scientiﬁc associa-
tions, editorial boards and program chairs. Accordingly, AI
researchers should conﬁgure the landscape of AI4 and deter-
mine what is relevant or off-topic for a venue. They can also
determine what the subareas are, so that proper reviewers and
sessions are allocated depending on the importance of each
area. It is unusual, however, to conduct a more systematic
analysis of how these choices are made. Three remarkable
exceptions are [Shah et al., 2017], where area relevance is
only examined on passing, [Fast and Horvitz, 2017] where
3http://www.scimagojr.com/shapeofscience/.
4https://aaai.org/Magazine/ailandscape.php.
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Figure 1: Papers published in AAAI (red dots) and IJCAI (blue triangles) conferences (1997-2017) separated by their area (topic “keyword”,
Table 3). Areas are mutually exclusive and sum up to 100% per year. General (dashed black line) tendencies and standard errors (bands) are
shown for both data series together.
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Figure 2: Documents included in AI topics (1970-2017) by area (topic “keyword”, Table 3). Legend as in Figure 1 (note that the x-axis is
different, with a much wider time span here).
the authors focus on views expressed about AI in the New
York Times over a 30-year period in terms of public concerns
as well as optimism, and [Moran et al., 2014], which focuses
on the venue keywords, including a cluster analysis on the
2013 keyword set and a new series of keywords, which were
adapted by AAAI2014. Table 3 shows an integration of their
selection with the keywords of AAAI2014.
3 Historical Data: Analysis by Keywords
We used the keywords in Table 3 for a ﬁrst quantitative anal-
ysis, using data obtained from two signiﬁcant sources:
• AAAI/IJCAI conferences (1997-2017). We obtained
data of all the accepted papers for these two confer-
ences from DBLP5. This database represents informa-
tion about computer science (and thus AI) that comes
mostly from their researchers (conference proceedings
and journals).
• AI topics documents (1905-2018). AI topics6 is an
archive kept by the AAAI, containing a variety of docu-
ments (e.g. news, blog entries, conferences, journals and
other repositories) that are collected automatically with
NewsFinder [Buchanan et al., 2013].
With a mapping approach between terms and the categories
in Table 3 as a representative list of subareas in AI, we sum-
marised trends in a series of plots. For the AAAI/IJCAI con-
ferences data, we used the keywords appearing in the pro-
ceedings, and for AI topics we used the tags (substrings ap-
pearing in titles, abstracts and topics). Regarding confer-
ences, other major venues (such as ECAI, ICML or NIPS)
were not included due to the lack of keyword information in
5http://dblp.uni-trier.de/
6https://aitopics.org/misc/about.
DBLP. Still, AAAI and IJCAI can be considered to be a rep-
resentative basis for analysing AI trends proper.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the areas in Table 3 for the
past 20 years using the AAAI/IJCAI data. Document counts
are normalised to sum up to 100% per year. Standard errors
are also shown, where in some cases the thickness of the band
is very variable (e.g., “Human & AI” and “Game Theory”)
due to data sparsity, or it cannot be computed due to insufﬁ-
cient data available (e.g., “Heuristic search & optimisation”).
Figure 2 shows a similar evolution based on the AI topics
data. If we visually compare the same keywords between the
plots found in Figures 1 and 2 (taking into account that axes
are different), we see that both sources are rather consistent
and highlight a few clear trends. For example, the categories
heuristic search & optimisation and knowledge representa-
tion show a decreasing trend. Other categories seemed to
have peaks: cognitive modeling in the 1990s, strongly as-
sociated with the emergence of several cognitive architec-
tures (e.g., ACT-R [Anderson et al., 1997], EPIC [Kieras
and Meyer, 1997] or SOAR [Newell, 1994]); planning meth-
ods around 2000, possibly due to the introduction of the ﬁrst
method for solving POMDP ofﬂine [Kaelbling et al., 1998],
jumpstarting its widespread use in robotics and automated
planning; and multiagent systems around 2010, when they
were successfully applied to real world scenarios (e.g., au-
tonomous vehicles [How et al., 2008]) and graphical applica-
tions (e.g., video games [Hagelba¨ck and Johansson, 2008]).
Some others had valleys, such as natural language process-
ing (NLP) around 2000, showing a paradigm shift (from
deterministic phrase structure analysis before the 1990s to
more probabilistic NLP methods). Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) recurrent neural net (RNN) models [Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber, 1997] have nowadays found rapid adoption due
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to an increase in computational capacity in the 2010s. Only
machine learning had a clear increasing trend over time found
in both sources, where the steepest slope is located in the
2010s and reveals the current relevance and attention, mostly
caused by deep learning and reinforcement learning. Over-
all, this is in agreement with the general perception about the
ﬁeld.
While the plots show a conﬁrmatory evidence of the chang-
ing trend in AI, using area keywords may only present one
side of AI. The choice and relevance may be highly dependent
on many factors such as the state of the art, the sociological
perceptions or a moving target. Thus, we question whether it
is possible to investigate the historical evoluation in a richer
and more systematic manner.
4 A Faceted Analysis of the Evolution of AI
The two dimensions in Table 1 can be used as a basis for a
different arrangement of tags and categories in our histori-
cal analysis. However, instead of taking a dichotomous and
monolithic perspective about dimensions, we consider the use
of facets. This is motivated by realising that when choosing
any criterion for analysis, there is always a gradation, and
sometimes this gradation does not follow a straight line be-
tween two extremes, but an area among two or more edges,
like a polygon. Hence, we use the term facet for this surface,
and the term edge for each of its boundaries. To illustrate this,
let us develop the ﬁrst two dimensions into facets:
• F1: The functionality facet (with edges ‘techniques’,
‘applications’ and ‘tasks’) analyses the functionality of
AI systems, such as knowledge representation, reason-
ing, learning, communication, perception, action, etc.
The processes of AI systems fall at the edge technique,
which relates to how AI systems “think”. We can also
characterise AI systems in terms of their behaviour (how
they “act”), leading to two different edges: the tasks they
solve and the application areas they are used in. This
facet can then be imagined as a triangle.
• F2: The referent facet (with edges ‘human’ and ‘uni-
versal’) distinguishes deﬁnitions or conceptions of AI
systems that go from an anthropocentric view to a
more universal (theoretical) perspective. At the “hu-
man” edge, AI could be characterised by being able to
solve all the tasks or by implementing all the intelli-
gent processes humans are able to do. This view would
be closely related to what is known as human-like AI
(see, e.g., [Lake et al., 2017]) or the view of AI as
pursuing human automation [Frey and Osborne, 2017;
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017]. On the other hand, if
AI is characterised at the “universal” edge, it would be
deﬁned in terms of a more theoretical set of problems or
by implementing some abstract processes.
Using the AI topics data, for the functionality facet we can
look at several categories for each of the three edges: tech-
niques, applications and tasks. We made tag-category map-
pings for about 30 techniques, 20 applications and 30 tasks. A
selection of categories for each edge is shown here, although
all the plots and results are presented in a separate link7. Fig 3
7Data, code and plots, and an online R Shiny app are publicly
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Figure 3: Functionality facet.
(a) shows the techniques with the highest peak in terms of
percentage. We see trends that are consistent with machine
learning taking more relevance, with roughly 4-5 times more
coverage over the 50 year period, and along the lines of what
was seen in the previous section. Fig 3 (b) shows the six most
popular application areas. Here the trends are ﬂatter, although
some slight trends can be seen for health & medicine and per-
sonal assistants, in line with the insights reported in related
work [Fast and Horvitz, 2017]. Finally, Fig 3 (c) shows the
relevance of chess, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, and
their decrease after Deep Blue beat Kasparov. Poker and
Robocup are examples of tasks that became representative
over a small period of time because of either an algorithmic
breakthrough or the popularity of their competitions.
For the referent facet, we can also explore its edges. Fig 4
(a) shows six groups that are most associated with the edge
‘human’. The only relatively clear trends are a fall in psychol-
ogy and an increase in security, privacy and safety. While
the former may be due to the decline of cognitive modelling
in general, the latter clearly underlines the rise of AI ethi-
cal and privacy issues already pointed out by several govern-
ments and agencies (e.g., [White House, 2016]), as well as the
appearance of new regulations (e.g., GPDR [EU Regulation,
2016]), ultimately triggered by public opinion and a concern
in the ﬁeld itself. Fig 4 (b) shows six groups that are most
available at: https://evoai.shinyapps.io/evoai/.
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associated with the edge ‘universal’. The representations are
rather ﬂat for this edge, with very variable coverage over the
whole period under analysis, but no clear trends.
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Figure 4: Referent facet.
Both the functionality and the referent facets are usually
linked to a large number of terms and keywords, and they
give a broad overview that is familiar to AI researchers. How-
ever, are these two facets sufﬁcient to characterise the object
and subject of AI? If we think of the elements of AI –its sys-
tems and services (the object)–, we need some other relevant
facets to characterise them, such as their generality, location
and embodiment. If we think of AI as a discipline (the sub-
ject), we need to consider its paradigms, actors, character and
nature. Let us describe these new seven facets:
• F3: The generality facet (with edges ‘speciﬁc’ and ‘gen-
eral’) considers whether AI is concerned with the cre-
ation of speciﬁc systems (i.e., solving one particular
task) or the development of systems (and techniques)
that solve (or can be applied to) a wide range of tasks.
This dichotomy is usually referred to as narrow versus
general AI.
• F4: The location facet (with edges ‘integration’ and
‘distribution’) depicts where a system starts and ends.
The very notion of centralised or distributed decision
making has been at the deﬁnitional level of agent for
a few decades, as well as the related notion of auton-
omy [Luck, 2017]. Also, there is an increasingly blurred
boundary on where human cognition ends and where it is
assisted, extended or orthosed by AI [Ford et al., 2015]
(and vice versa, through human computation [Quinn and
Bederson, 2011]).
• F5: The embodiment facet (with edges ‘physical’ and
‘virtual’) distinguishes whether the AI system is linked
to a body or physical equipment or, on the contrary,
is basically of algorithmic character, installed on de-
vices, working on the cloud or migrating between differ-
ent platforms, usually dealing with elements in a digital
world.
• F6: The paradigm facet (with edges ‘discrete’, ‘contin-
uous’ and ‘probabilistic’) distinguishes the underlying
approaches behind many principles and tools of AI. At
the discrete edge, we see those problems and methods
seen in a combinatorial way, where a logical or evolu-
tionary process combines or applies operators. At the
continuous edge, we see quantitative optimisation prob-
lems tackled with gradient descent, kernels and matrix
operations. And, on the probabilistic edge, problems are
seen in a probabilistic, stochastic or statistical view.
• F7: The actor facet (with edges ‘academia’, ‘industry’,
‘government’ and ‘independent’) identiﬁes who are the
driving forces behind AI as a discipline. This facet con-
siders who is most relevant in –and ultimately steering–
the discipline according to its current challenges, regu-
lations and potential future advances.
• F8: The character facet (with edges ‘empirical’ and
‘theoretical’) determines whether AI is guided by exper-
iments, like other empirical disciplines, or whether it is
of a more theoretical nature. Note that this facet is differ-
ent from the referent facet (e.g., a non-anthropocentric
view can be very experimental).
• F9: The nature facet (with edges ‘technology’, ‘engi-
neering’, ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’) describes AI ac-
cording to what kind of discipline it is. This loosely cor-
responds respectively to whether it creates devices and
products, solves problems, answers/asks questions.
We do not show individual categories for these facets due to
space limitations. Instead, we will look at the aggregation
of categories by edges, assuming the edges are exclusive (so
their share is always 100%). In a way, this can be understood
as a non-monolithic view of polarities in sentiment analysis.
Fig. 5 shows this share for the nine facets, where the data has
been smoothed with a moving average ﬁlter. We see trends
for many of them: an increase of the relevance of applica-
tions for F1 and the focus on more speciﬁc systems for F3 (the
number, but also the diversiﬁcation, of applications may ex-
plain this), more virtual systems for F5 (with the appearance
of many new AI experimentation and evaluation platforms
[Herna´ndez-Orallo et al., 2017]), more continuous paradigms
for F6 (given the success of deep learning and other methods
based on this paradigm), more industry for F7 (and mostly at
the cost of academia), a more empirical character for F8 and
a view of the discipline in a more technological way for F9
(which may be one possible reason for the current concern in
AI safety and governance, usually harder to handle when the
engineering and scientiﬁc perspectives are weak). Overall,
we can also see that the trends in some facets, especially the
shifts from the 2000s, may be strongly related (facets F1, F3,
F7 and F9).
One important insight that we can gain from the visual out-
put shown in all these plots is that some trends peak, while
some others are cyclic. Consequently, the plots have explana-
tory and conﬁrmatory value about the relevance of different
areas and perspectives of how AI is deﬁned. However, we
have to be cautious and not use them for forecasting. In fact,
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Figure 5: Share of all edges per facet in AI topics (facets F1-F9,
ordered left to right, top to bottom).
from a governance perspective, there is a known bias towards
reinforcing the dominant view (the winner takes all) or even
confounding the part with the whole (e.g., deep learning with
machine learning, and machine learning with AI). Therefore,
this quantitative analysis could be used to inform compen-
satory actions with some less popular but important areas, so
that the discipline is ready when dominant paradigms shift or
some of their pathways plateau.
5 Qualitative Analysis
The facets are also useful to analyse AI in a more qualitative
manner. For example, F1 to F5 are based on the object of AI
and can characterise either particular AI systems or AI as a
discipline. On the other hand, F6 to F9 focus on the subject,
being more methodological for the discipline as a whole.
Let us examine the ﬁrst ﬁve facets from the perspective of
the AI systems and components. In the end, if we set the goal
of AI as building and understanding AI systems then the con-
tours of the discipline will be clear as far as we have a clear
notion of what an AI system is. Nonetheless, the question re-
mains: how can we characterise this in a stable way for the
years to come?
Looking forward, the referent facet (F2) seems to become
very relevant. We are aware of AI systems already exceed-
ing some human capabilities and this will continue to be so
during the century. Considering human intelligence as a goal
has been a driving force (and will continue to be so in the
near future), but it is rather short-sighted. Instead, placing AI
as exploring a more universal ‘intelligence landscape’ is not
only more inclusive about what AI is (systems solving tasks
humans cannot solve would still be part of AI), but represents
a Copernican view where humans are no longer at the centre
(see Figure 6). For instance, the terms human-level machine
intelligence or human-level artiﬁcial intelligence have many
issues (is it for all tasks?, what is an average human?, how to
extrapolate beyond human level?). Actually, the term –albeit
not the deﬁnition– is usually replaced by high-level machine
intelligence [Mu¨ller and Bostrom, ] or simply AGI (which
should rather refer to facet F3).
Of course, even if humans are not taken as a reference, they
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Figure 6: Top: Anthropocentric AI. Bottom: AI in the ‘intelligence
landscape’.
still have to be put at the central position due to the interac-
tion and impact of AI on them. But this is usually referred
to as human-centred artiﬁcial intelligence. For instance, ap-
plications must be prioritised according to human needs, and
for many of these applications we want more ‘human-like’ AI
[Lake et al., 2017; Marcus, 2018], more ‘human-beneﬁcial’
AI (i.e., safer and taking the values of humans into account
[Russell et al., 2015; Amodei et al., 2016]) and also more
‘human-ethical’ AI [Goldsmith and Burton, 2017]. Note that
we do not want to replicate certain behaviours humans dis-
play (e.g., gender bias) in our AI systems. In many cases, it
is not that AI should automate all tasks humans do, or per-
form better than humans, but AI should also do other tasks
or perform very differently. Consequently, there should be
no reason why some tasks are excluded from AI when they
are solved in a different way. This –known as the ‘AI effect’
[McCorduck, 2004]– is partly motivated because of the spe-
cialisation of the solution, as we will discuss below.
The bottom view of Figure 6 opens the contours of AI but
requires the deﬁnition of the intelligence landscape. That
takes us back to the range around functionality facet and Ta-
ble 1 (right), between thinking and acting. We have seen in
the quantitative analysis that techniques, tasks and applica-
tions are volatile, so any enumeration of them is going to be
incomplete.
An alternative view based on skills and abilities can endure
changes much better [Herna´ndez-Orallo, 2016; 2017]. For in-
stance, perception, learning and planning have been consub-
stantial in AI. Systems having some of these skills are recog-
nised as AI without further information about the techniques
or the particular tasks the elements are applied to, in the same
way we do for non-human animals. This is actually the true
core of facet F1.
But skills and abilities can only be characterised by look-
ing at facets F3, F4 and F5. For instance, having n different
systems for navigating n different buildings would not con-
vince us that AI systems today have very good navigation
skills (F3, generality). They would just be narrow systems
not really having the skill. Similarly, the system might ac-
tually be controlled by many subsystems on the Internet, us-
ing real-time data from sensors around the building and even
from the devices the humans in the building are using (F4,
location). Finally, it is not the same to physically navigate a
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real building than a virtual scenario (F5, embodiment).
In fact, we are heading towards the direction of AI ser-
vices instead of AI systems, which is typically known as
cognition as a service [Spohrer and Banavar, 2015]. In
cognitive services research, the focus is on bringing down
the overall cost and increasing general performance. How-
ever, certain considerations must be taken into account, espe-
cially in the context of automation [Frey and Osborne, 2017;
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017]. For example, what is
the difference between full automation and efﬁcient semi-
automation? Furthermore, the blurred line between work
contributed by AI systems and humans makes it even harder
to differentiate how performance can be attributed realisti-
cally. Also, some tasks can be ﬁnally automated in ways
where AI plays a secondary role, by changes in the logical
or physical conﬁguration. For instance, an intelligent robot
can be helped by a proper design of the body, usually referred
to as morphological intelligence [Winﬁeld, 2017].
Interestingly, the phenomenon of AI being more powerful
because of the use of human data or human computation is
mirrored by the extended mind [Clark and Chalmers, 1998].
The human mind is viewed as incorporating all of its mind
tools, from pen and paper to cognitive assistants. The con-
tours of where the human mind ends, and whether the sur-
rounding tools and devices are included, is also important to
determine where the AI system ends too, and who really pro-
vides the services. Hence, the facets F3 to F5 will become
more relevant and sophisticated in the future. Perhaps instead
of autonomy, we will need to trace how much each part con-
tributes to the whole ability of the whole system or service.
Finally, as we mentioned above, the four last facets have
a more methodological stance. For instance, it seems irrel-
evant what paradigm from facet F6 is most important at the
moment. For instance, arcade games (such as the Atari ALE
benchmark) can now be played with relatively good perfor-
mance using deep reinforcement learning [Mnih et al., 2015],
evolutionary programming [Kelly and Heywood, 2017] or
neuroevolution [Hausknecht et al., 2014]. However, if it is
the case that more and more AI systems are using continu-
ous, gradient-descent, approaches rather than more discrete,
combinatorial, approaches, this may have an impact on the
contours with neighbouring disciplines. AI would be clash-
ing more often with algebra, optimisation and statistics (or
even physics), and would be pulled away from the traditional
logic and discrete mathematics (or even evolution). Simi-
larly, whether approaches are more empirical or theoretical,
according to facet F8, is not necessarily a reason to be con-
sidered more or less AI, but can still affect the perception of
the ﬁeld, and the boundaries with some other disciplines.
Facets F7 (actors) and F9 (nature) are related, as it is mostly
academia that cares for scientiﬁc and philosophical questions
about AI. If we look at Figure 6 again, all actors will be in-
terested in building systems and services that cover the intel-
ligence landscape for an increasing number of applications,
considering AI as a technology and focusing on engineering.
But it is mostly (or only) academia which is interested in what
the intelligence landscape looks like, the evaluation of where
systems are located in this space and what the implications
are while covering this landscape. These and some other ar-
eas will have to be prioritised by academia (and government
funding) in order to have more vision and governance within
the ﬁeld of AI.
6 Conclusion
Artiﬁcial intelligence, as any other scientiﬁc discipline, is
partly a social phenomenon, and its deﬁnition and contour
are highly inﬂuenced by its actors and stakeholders. We
will always need to track and update the ﬁeld in many ways,
from the use of self-reported questionnaires8 to data from the
venues and news related to AI.
In this paper, we presented a series of facets and associ-
ated edges to analyse the historical evolution of AI, and gath-
ered some insight into its future. The data of venues and AI
repositories were useful for quantitative analyses. Moreover,
the data and the mapping between tags and categories are
publicly provided so that others can apply the same faceted
framework to other sources of data about AI. Finally, the
facets represent a framework to discuss, in a more qualita-
tive way, the past, present and future of AI, and its relation to
other disciplines.
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